


# The Sanctions Project

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
# Today's Talk

- Access Controls
- Other Privileged Operations
- Granularity
- Sanctions
- Conclusions




# Access Controls

- Subjects Accessing Objects
  - Subject is an active entity
  - Object is a passive entity
  - Access is an operation preformed on an object by a subject
  - Covered by POSIX P1003.1e DRAFT
    - As permitted by P1003




# Other Privileged Operations

- Everything Else
  - Device specific ioctl()s
  - Privileged ports
  - System configuration
  - Tuning




# Granularity

- None
  - Always grant or never grant
- Root or not
- Capabilities
  - Based on “POSIX objects”
- Each decision considered independently
  - SELinux does this for its policies



# Sanctions

- Each decision considered independently
- `capable(CAP_FOO)`
- `sanction(credential,  
subject_type, object_type,  
access_type)`
- Lots of each type




# Do We Need Sanctions?

- Detangle capabilities from LSM
  - SELinux direct capability changes
    - Does it's own, sort of
  - Smack already does direct capabilities
  - Current situation isn't so bad



# Sanctions Project


- Waiting on active projects
  - Credentials
  - SELinux direct capability calls
- Waiting on a cause
  - Finer granularity than capabilities for access control, not just CAP\_SYS\_ADMIN





# What Have You Learned?

- Sanctions provide arbitrary granularity
- They will be very hard to maintain
- They are waiting on a purpose



# Special Thank You

- POSIX P1003.1e/2c Working Group

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