Difference between revisions of "Kernel Development"
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<sup>2</sup>Allow SELinux to selectively grant capabilities authoritatively based on SELinux domain. Executables could be made privileged w/o needing to be setuid root, all via SELinux without needing yet another mechanism like file capabilities. Eliminate the need for filesystem capabilities support (which will be a nightmare to manage, as they are per-file bitmaps vs. per-type access | <sup>2</sup>Allow SELinux to selectively grant capabilities authoritatively based on SELinux domain. Executables could be made privileged w/o needing to be setuid root, all via SELinux without needing yet another mechanism like file capabilities. Eliminate the need for filesystem capabilities support (which will be a nightmare to manage, as they are per-file bitmaps vs. per-type access | ||
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* Support for 64-bit capabilities (sds of the NSA) | * Support for 64-bit capabilities (sds of the NSA) | ||
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+ | <sup>1</sup> Provide a static inline helper for all FMODE_READ/FMODE_WRITE checks that also includes the corresponding security_file_permission() call to help ensure that they always happen together in the future. Possibly even rolling up rw_verify_area() checking as well into it. | ||
+ | </p> |
Revision as of 20:06, 15 February 2008
To Do List
- Reduce memory usage of selinux structs: pahole, remove needless backpointers (eparis RH BZ#235284)
- Add a 'map' check on mmap and mprotect so that we can distinguish memory mapped access (since it has different implications for revocation).
- Add open perm to help with the fd redirection issue, so that r/w can be given out more liberally without allowing direct open, requiring access via fd use. See http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=120118041128655&w=2
- btrfs support
- Possibly: eliminate security_file_permission altogether and switch to a revoke-based model if the revoke support in -mm goes upstream (i.e. don't revalidate on use, revoke upon file relabel or policy change).
- Export current policy via selinuxfs so that it can be verified and analyzed.
- Review Netlink link creation API code for security hook coverage.
- cap_override class2 (in progress NSA)
- Investigate namespaces.
- Compile out LSM hooks & allow SELinux to be linked directly.
- Automate checking for new syscalls in kernels (-mm, -rc etc).
- remove secondary module stacking code (eparis RH BZ#231890)
- security_port_sid needs optimization (eparis RH BZ#234531, HP planning to do it for 2.6.26)
- fine grained enforcement of sysfs objects (RH BZ#228902)
- additional support of a security netfilter table for secmark/net forwarding (RH: RFC patch posted)
- Normalize the SELinux in-kernel API.
- Namespacing of SELinux global functions and variables.
- NFSv4 support (in progress)
- KVM controls
- Finer-grained proc checking (so that we don't require full ptrace permission just to read process state),
- Improve/fix ioctl checking (see prior discussions on selinux and linux-security-module list),
- Revoke memory-mapped file access upon policy change or setxattr.
- Real device labeling and access control (i.e. bind a label to a device in the kernel irrespective of what device node is used to access it so that a process that can create any device nodes at all can't effectively bypass all device access controls just by creating an arbitrary node to any device in a type accessible to it),
- Full APIs for getting and setting security contexts of sockets and IPC objects.
- Polyinstantiated ports
- Increased granularity for Generic Netlink
- CIFS support for single-context clients (also has xattrs & Karl says it's better than NFS).
- lhype controls (investigate & compare with KVM controls)
- Investigate integration with integrity & measurement
- Crypto policy for domains & object handling
- Expand LTP as a full regression testuite for every permission & class
- Convert sk_callback_lock to RCU
- Redo performance testing & profiling
- Support for kernel namespaces
- Better controls for posix message queues (?)
- move *mem permissions to new memprotect class. Bump policy version.
- discovery of class and permission offsets 3
Notes:
2Allow SELinux to selectively grant capabilities authoritatively based on SELinux domain. Executables could be made privileged w/o needing to be setuid root, all via SELinux without needing yet another mechanism like file capabilities. Eliminate the need for filesystem capabilities support (which will be a nightmare to manage, as they are per-file bitmaps vs. per-type access
vectors).3 Make the hooks/avc layer request class/perm offsets from security server so that static offsets are no longer necessary and obsolete kernel classes can be purged.
Known Bugs
- exporting nfs with the nohide options causes problems on ia64 clients (struct nfs_mount_data corruption)
Done
- Fix context_struct_compute_av latency issue raised by Ingo Molnar (lkml post)
- Better support for sys_splice and related syscalls
- change Kconfig to use select instead of depends (eparis RH BZ# 228899)
- allow undefined classes and permissions in kernel (eparis RH BZ#235280)
- explicitly set i_ino on all creations in selinuxfs (eparis RH BZ#235248)
- Review sys_fallocate if/when it is merged
- Labeling for loopback and forwarded traffic (done: HP)
- security_file_permission callsite consolidation1 (done: RH)
- Add hook for filesystems with binary mount data per requests by fsdevel folk (done: RH)
- Support for 64-bit capabilities (sds of the NSA)
1 Provide a static inline helper for all FMODE_READ/FMODE_WRITE checks that also includes the corresponding security_file_permission() call to help ensure that they always happen together in the future. Possibly even rolling up rw_verify_area() checking as well into it.