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|== To Do List ==||== To Do List ==|
|-||* Open code POLICY_RDLOCK and friends (per suggestion from akpm) [||+|
|+||* Open code POLICY_RDLOCK and friends (per suggestion from akpm) |
|* Investigate security policy for cgroups.||* Investigate security policy for cgroups.|
Revision as of 12:49, 6 June 2008
To Do List
- Reduce size of critical sections and use of GFP_ATOMIC.
- Remove load_mutex mutex.
- Open code POLICY_RDLOCK and friends (per suggestion from akpm) [patches queued]
- Investigate security policy for cgroups.
- Labeling for loopback traffic (in progress HP).
- Reduce memory usage of selinux structs: pahole (eparis RH BZ#235284)
- Add a 'map' check on mmap and mprotect so that we can distinguish memory mapped access (since it has different implications for revocation).
- btrfs support
- Export current policy via selinuxfs so that it can be verified and analyzed.
- cap_override class2 (rfc patch posted, needs re-base and extension for 64-bit caps)
- Compile out LSM hooks & allow SELinux to be linked directly.
- Automate checking for new syscalls in kernels (-mm, -rc etc).
- remove secondary module stacking code (eparis RH BZ#231890)
- fine grained enforcement of sysfs objects (RH BZ#228902)
- ditto for usbfs and other pseudo filesystems of interest
- additional support of a security netfilter table for secmark/net forwarding (RH: merged to nf repo)
- Namespacing of SELinux global functions and variables.
- NFSv4 support (in progress)
- Linux hv controls (in progress Tresys?)
- Finer-grained proc checking so that we don't require full ptrace permission just to read process state (rfc patch posted),
- Improve/fix ioctl checking (patch posted, being tested in Fedora), 4
- Revoke memory-mapped file access upon policy change or setxattr.
- Real device labeling and access control (i.e. bind a label to a device in the kernel irrespective of what device node is used to access it so that a process that can create any device nodes at all can't effectively bypass all device access controls just by creating an arbitrary node to any device in a type accessible to it),
- Full APIs for getting and setting security contexts of sockets and IPC objects. Ensure that socket context is kept consistent on socket inode and sock structures when changed.
- Polyinstantiated ports
- Increased granularity for Generic Netlink
- CIFS support for single-context clients (also has xattrs & Karl says it's better than NFS).
- Investigate integration with integrity measurement (in progress IBM and NSA)
- Crypto policy for domains & object handling
- Expand LTP as a full regression testuite for every permission & class
- Redo performance testing & profiling
- Support for kernel namespaces: labeling and access controls on namespaces, per-namespace policy?
- Similar support for chroots to support build systems?
- Better controls for posix message queues (?)
- move *mem permissions to new memprotect class. Bump policy version.
- discovery of class and permission offsets 3
- better support for FS whose labelling behaviour is not specified in policy. If nothing from policy just test for xattr support and use it if it is there.
2Allow SELinux to selectively grant capabilities authoritatively based on SELinux domain. Executables could be made privileged w/o needing to be setuid root, all via SELinux without needing yet another mechanism like file capabilities. Eliminate the need for filesystem capabilities support (which will be a nightmare to manage, as they are per-file bitmaps vs. per-type accessvectors).
3 Make the hooks/avc layer request class/perm offsets from security server so that static offsets are no longer necessary and obsolete kernel classes can be purged.
4"replacing the default case in selinux_file_ioctl with a simple test of _IOC_DIR(cmd) as in Smack, mapping to FILE__WRITE and/or FILE__READ accordingly."
- Finalize NFS binary mount support: ensure new hooks are called.
- Review Netlink link creation API code for security hook coverage.
- Remove obsolete object backpointers.
- Fix context_struct_compute_av latency issue raised by Ingo Molnar (lkml post)
- Better support for sys_splice and related syscalls
- change Kconfig to use select instead of depends (eparis RH BZ# 228899)
- allow undefined classes and permissions in kernel (eparis RH BZ#235280)
- explicitly set i_ino on all creations in selinuxfs (eparis RH BZ#235248)
- Review sys_fallocate if/when it is merged
- Labeling for forwarded traffic (done: HP)
- security_file_permission callsite consolidation1 (done: RH)
- Add hook for filesystems with binary mount data per requests by fsdevel folk (done: RH)
- add NFSv4 support for command line mount options. (done: RH)
- Support for 64-bit capabilities (sds of the NSA)
- Display LSM mount options in /proc/mounts (done: RH)
- Permissive domains (done: RH).
- printk prefixes and error message cleanup (done: RH)
- open permission (done: RH)
- security_port_sid optimization (done: HP, netport cache)
- Normalize SELinux in-kernel API (obsolete: converted to LSM hooks)
- Support for setting down unknown file contexts for package managers and filesystem restore (done: NSA, deferred mapping of contexts patch)
1 Provide a static inline helper for all FMODE_READ/FMODE_WRITE checks that also includes the corresponding security_file_permission() call to help ensure that they always happen together in the future. Possibly even rolling up rw_verify_area() checking as well into it.
- Adding New Permissions How to add a new permission to SELinux
- kerneloops.org oopses relating to SELinux.