Difference between revisions of "Kernel Development"

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(To Do List: added 64-bit caps)
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== To Do List ==
 
== To Do List ==
  
* Support for 64-bit capabilities.
+
* Fix error propagation for policydb_read to reflect actual errors rather than the default of -EINVAL.
  
* Add a 'map' check on mmap and mprotect so that we can distinguish memory mapped access (since it has different implications for revocation).
+
* Reduce SELinux memory footprint, both static and dynamic.
  
* Add open perm to help with the fd redirection issue, so that r/w can be given out more liberally without allowing direct open, requiring access via fd useSee http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=120118041128655&w=2
+
* Improve scripts/selinux/mdp to generate a more useful minimal policy as a starting pointAlso make it more flexible.
  
* btrfs support
+
* Dynamic discovery of initial SIDs, similar to dynamic discovery of classes/perms.  Map kernel initial SIDs to policy initial SIDs by string name rather than requiring identical index values, handle unknown initial SIDs cleanly (map to unlabeled), and allow future extensibility without causing problems (start regular SIDs at some fixed offset, e.g. 100, or start from the highest legal value and decrement, so that policy reload that changes the number of initial SIDs won't affect them).
  
* Possibly: eliminate security_file_permission altogether and switch to a revoke-based model if the revoke support in -mm goes upstream (i.e. don't revalidate on use, revoke upon file relabel or policy change).
+
* Distinguish access(2) from open(2) auditing (see
 +
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=495211).
  
* Export current policy via selinuxfs so that it can be verified and analyzed.
+
* Audit hooks to ensure that we don't have any more cases where DAC can be weakened.
  
* Review ''Netlink link creation API'' code for security hook coverage.
+
* Fix the performance issue apparently related to syscall audit which Linus keeps whining about.
  
* cap_override class<sup>2</sup>  (in progress NSA)
+
* Add support for SCTP (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=517676).
  
* Investigate namespaces.
+
* Fix signal inheritance controls (possibly drop some or all, or only enforce in policy for certain domains).
+
* Compile out LSM hooks & allow SELinux to be linked directly.
+
  
* Automate checking for new syscalls in kernels (-mm, -rc etc).
+
* UBIFS support.
  
* remove secondary module stacking code (eparis RH BZ#231890)
+
* Add LTP tests for recent kernel changes.
  
* security_port_sid needs optimization (eparis RH BZ#234531, HP planning to do it for 2.6.26)
+
* Eliminate the need for secondary_ops altogether by providing LSM support for reverting to the original (capability) security module.
  
* Reduce memory usage of selinux structs (eparis RH BZ#235284)
+
* Reduce size of critical sections and use of GFP_ATOMIC.
  
* fine grained enforcement of sysfs objects (RH BZ#228902)
+
* Investigate security policy for cgroups.
  
* additional support of a security netfilter table for secmark/net forwarding (RH: RFC patch posted)
+
* Add a 'map' check on mmap and mprotect so that we can distinguish memory mapped access (since it has different implications for revocation).
  
* Normalize the SELinux in-kernel API.
+
* crfs ?
  
* Namespacing of SELinux global functions and variables.
+
* Automate checking for new syscalls in kernels (-mm, -rc etc).
 +
 
 +
* fine-grained labeling for usbfs and other pseudo filesystems of interest
  
 
* NFSv4 support (in progress)
 
* NFSv4 support (in progress)
 
* KVM controls
 
 
* Finer-grained proc checking (so that we don't require full ptrace permission just to read process state),
 
 
* Improve/fix ioctl checking (see prior discussions on selinux and linux-security-module list),
 
  
 
* Revoke memory-mapped file access upon policy change or setxattr.
 
* Revoke memory-mapped file access upon policy change or setxattr.
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* Real device labeling and access control (i.e. bind a label to a device in the kernel irrespective of what device node is used to access it so that a process that can create any device nodes at all can't effectively bypass all device access controls just by creating an arbitrary node to any device in a type accessible to it),
 
* Real device labeling and access control (i.e. bind a label to a device in the kernel irrespective of what device node is used to access it so that a process that can create any device nodes at all can't effectively bypass all device access controls just by creating an arbitrary node to any device in a type accessible to it),
  
* Full APIs for getting and setting security contexts of sockets and IPC objects.
+
* Full APIs for getting and setting security contexts of sockets and IPC objects.  Ensure that socket context is kept consistent on socket inode and sock structures when changed.
  
 
* Polyinstantiated ports
 
* Polyinstantiated ports
Line 56: Line 51:
  
 
* CIFS support for single-context clients (also has xattrs & Karl says it's better than NFS).
 
* CIFS support for single-context clients (also has xattrs & Karl says it's better than NFS).
 
* lhype controls (investigate & compare with KVM controls)
 
 
* Investigate integration with integrity & measurement
 
  
 
* Crypto policy for domains & object handling
 
* Crypto policy for domains & object handling
  
 
* Expand LTP as a full regression testuite for every permission & class
 
* Expand LTP as a full regression testuite for every permission & class
 
* Convert sk_callback_lock to RCU
 
  
 
* Redo performance testing & profiling
 
* Redo performance testing & profiling
 
* Support for kernel namespaces
 
  
 
* Better controls for posix message queues (?)
 
* Better controls for posix message queues (?)
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* move *mem permissions to new memprotect class.  Bump policy version.
 
* move *mem permissions to new memprotect class.  Bump policy version.
  
* discovery of class and permission offsets <sup>3</sup>
+
* better support for FS whose labelling behaviour is not specified in policy.  If nothing from policy just test for xattr support and use it if it is there (RH in progress, patch reverted due to fuse deadlocks).
  
* missing audit patch for audit=0 http://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-March/msg00028.html
+
* memory leak detector pops on policy reload. probably due to {new,old}policydb being on stack and memcpy'd into the data section policydb (aka probably false positive)
  
* AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE messages are logged twice http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=252358
+
* better validation of classes/perms on policy reload. Warn if any permissions are defined in a kernel class in the policy that are not defined in the kernel's classmap.
  
 
''Notes:''
 
''Notes:''
 
<p>
 
<p>
<sup>1</sup> Provide a static inline helper for all FMODE_READ/FMODE_WRITE checks that also includes the corresponding security_file_permission() call to help ensure that they always happen together in the future.  Possibly even rolling up rw_verify_area() checking as well into it.
+
</p>
</p><p>
+
<sup>2</sup>Allow SELinux to selectively grant capabilities authoritatively based on SELinux domain. Executables could be made privileged w/o needing to be setuid root, all via SELinux without needing yet another mechanism like file capabilities.  Eliminate the need for filesystem capabilities support (which will be a nightmare to manage, as they are per-file bitmaps vs. per-type access
+
vectors).</p>
+
<p>
+
<sup>3</sup> Make the hooks/avc layer request class/perm offsets from security server so that static offsets are no longer necessary and obsolete kernel classes can be purged.</p>
+
 
+
== Known Bugs ==
+
* exporting nfs with the nohide options causes problems on ia64 clients (struct nfs_mount_data corruption)
+
 
+
 
+
== Done ==
+
 
+
* Fix  context_struct_compute_av latency issue raised by Ingo Molnar ([http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=118095653422494&w=2 lkml post])
+
 
+
* Better support for sys_splice and related syscalls
+
 
+
* change Kconfig to use select instead of depends (eparis RH BZ# 228899)
+
 
+
* allow undefined classes and permissions in kernel (eparis RH BZ#235280)
+
 
+
* explicitly set i_ino on all creations in selinuxfs (eparis RH BZ#235248)
+
 
+
* Review sys_fallocate if/when it is merged
+
  
* Labeling for loopback and forwarded traffic (done: HP)
+
== Resources ==
  
* security_file_permission callsite consolidation<sup>1</sup> (done: RH)
+
* [[Adding New Permissions]] How to add a new permission to SELinux
  
* Add hook for filesystems with binary mount data per requests by fsdevel folk (done: RH)
+
* [http://www.kerneloops.org/searchfile.php?search=security%2Fselinux kerneloops.org] oopses relating to SELinux.

Latest revision as of 23:05, 20 April 2010

To Do List

  • Fix error propagation for policydb_read to reflect actual errors rather than the default of -EINVAL.
  • Reduce SELinux memory footprint, both static and dynamic.
  • Improve scripts/selinux/mdp to generate a more useful minimal policy as a starting point. Also make it more flexible.
  • Dynamic discovery of initial SIDs, similar to dynamic discovery of classes/perms. Map kernel initial SIDs to policy initial SIDs by string name rather than requiring identical index values, handle unknown initial SIDs cleanly (map to unlabeled), and allow future extensibility without causing problems (start regular SIDs at some fixed offset, e.g. 100, or start from the highest legal value and decrement, so that policy reload that changes the number of initial SIDs won't affect them).
  • Distinguish access(2) from open(2) auditing (see

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=495211).

  • Audit hooks to ensure that we don't have any more cases where DAC can be weakened.
  • Fix the performance issue apparently related to syscall audit which Linus keeps whining about.
  • Fix signal inheritance controls (possibly drop some or all, or only enforce in policy for certain domains).
  • UBIFS support.
  • Add LTP tests for recent kernel changes.
  • Eliminate the need for secondary_ops altogether by providing LSM support for reverting to the original (capability) security module.
  • Reduce size of critical sections and use of GFP_ATOMIC.
  • Investigate security policy for cgroups.
  • Add a 'map' check on mmap and mprotect so that we can distinguish memory mapped access (since it has different implications for revocation).
  • crfs ?
  • Automate checking for new syscalls in kernels (-mm, -rc etc).
  • fine-grained labeling for usbfs and other pseudo filesystems of interest
  • NFSv4 support (in progress)
  • Revoke memory-mapped file access upon policy change or setxattr.
  • Real device labeling and access control (i.e. bind a label to a device in the kernel irrespective of what device node is used to access it so that a process that can create any device nodes at all can't effectively bypass all device access controls just by creating an arbitrary node to any device in a type accessible to it),
  • Full APIs for getting and setting security contexts of sockets and IPC objects. Ensure that socket context is kept consistent on socket inode and sock structures when changed.
  • Polyinstantiated ports
  • Increased granularity for Generic Netlink
  • CIFS support for single-context clients (also has xattrs & Karl says it's better than NFS).
  • Crypto policy for domains & object handling
  • Expand LTP as a full regression testuite for every permission & class
  • Redo performance testing & profiling
  • Better controls for posix message queues (?)
  • move *mem permissions to new memprotect class. Bump policy version.
  • better support for FS whose labelling behaviour is not specified in policy. If nothing from policy just test for xattr support and use it if it is there (RH in progress, patch reverted due to fuse deadlocks).
  • memory leak detector pops on policy reload. probably due to {new,old}policydb being on stack and memcpy'd into the data section policydb (aka probably false positive)
  • better validation of classes/perms on policy reload. Warn if any permissions are defined in a kernel class in the policy that are not defined in the kernel's classmap.

Notes:

Resources