From SELinux Wiki
See Also: TypeEnforcement
 Type Enforcement (TE)
SELinux makes use of a specific style of type enforcement (TE) to enforce mandatory access control. For SELinux it means that all subjects and objects have a type identifier associated to them that can then be used to enforce rules laid down by policy.
The SELinux type identifier is a simple variable-length string that is defined in the policy and then associated to a security context. It is also used in the majority of SELinux language statements and rules used to build a policy that will, when loaded into the security server, enforce policy via the object managers.
Because the type identifier (or just 'type') is associated to all subjects and objects, it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish what the type is actually associated with (it's not helped by the fact that by convention, type identifiers end in '_t'). In the end it comes down to understanding how they are allocated in the policy itself and how they are used by SELinux services (although CIL policies with namespaces do help in that a domain process 'type' could be declared as msg_filter.ext_gateway.process with object types being any others (such as msg_filter.ext_gateway.exec).
Basically if the type identifier is used to reference a subject it is referring to a Linux process or collection of processes (a domain or domain type). If the type identifier is used to reference an object then it is specifying its object type (i.e. file type).
While SELinux refers to a subject as being an active process that is associated to a domain type, the scope of an SELinux type enforcement domain can vary widely. For example in the simple policy built in the basic-selinux-policy directory of the source tarball, all the processes on the system run in the unconfined_t domain (or for the CIL version in the unconfined.process domain), therefore every process is 'of type unconfined_t' (that means it can do whatever it likes within the limits of the standard Linux DAC policy as all access is allowed by SELinux).
It is only when additional policy statements are added to the simple policy that areas start to be confined. For example, an external gateway is run in its own isolated domain (ext_gateway_t) that cannot be 'interfered' with by any of the unconfined_t processes (except to run or transition the gateway process into its own domain). This scenario is similar to the 'targeted' policy delivered as standard in Red Hat Fedora where the majority of user space processes run under the unconfined_t domain (although don't think the simple policies implemented in source tarball are equivalent to the Reference Policy, they are not - so do not use them as live implementations).
The SELinux type is the third component of a 'security context' and by convention SELinux types end in '_t', however this is not enforced by any SELinux service (i.e. it is only used to identify the type component), although as explained above CIL with namespaces does make identification of types easier.
It is possible to add constraints on users, roles, types and MLS ranges, for example within a TE environment, the way that subjects are allowed to access an object is via a TE allow rule, for example:
allow unconfined_t ext_gateway_t : process transition;
This states that a process running in the unconfined_t domain has permission to transition a process to the ext_gateway_t domain. However it could be that the policy writer wants to constrain this further and state that this can only happen if the role of the source domain is the same as the role of the target domain. To achieve this a constraint can be imposed using a constrain statement:
constrain process transition ( r1 == r2 );
This states that a process transition can only occur if the source role is the same as the target role, therefore a constraint is a condition that must be satisfied in order for one or more permissions to be granted (i.e. a constraint imposes additional restrictions on TE rules). Note that the constraint is based on an object class (process in this case) and one or more of its permissions.
The kernel policy language constraints are defined in the Constraint Statements section).
It is possible to add bounds to users, roles and types, however currently only types are enforced by the kernel using the typebounds rule as described in the Bounds Overview section (although user and role bounds may be declared using CIL, however they are validated at compile time).
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- ↑ There are various 'type enforcement' technologies.